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Impacts of enterprise zones on local households in Vietnam 
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Abstract  
Based on the “winner-loser” scheme, we examine the possible impacts of enterprise zones 
(EZs) on local Vietnamese households between 2002 and 2008, using differences-in-
differences and a panel-event study. We layer four waves of household surveys using a census 
of EZs in 2007, based on the same commune identity for our household and individual analyses. 
Within five years of EZ establishment, we find they are associated with higher household 
incomes, an increase in private property prices, and an increase in working hours. However, 
we do not find a significant impact on household living expenditure or school 
attendance/working probabilities among members aged between 7 and 17 years. Neither do we 
find a significant impact on health outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the term has appeared throughout the history of development in the form of 
various phrases, such as industrial zone/park/cluster, (special) economic zone, export-
processing zone and so forth (see Akinci and Crittle, 2008 for the variations in the history), a 
zone is often considered an area with defined boundaries with specific policies, typically 
referred to as place-based policies. We focus on zones mainly to attract businesses and firms 
and refer to enterprise zone (EZ, hereafter). The EZ is designed for specific policy objectives 
such as free trade, export manufacturing, regional development, and policy experiments.  
More specifically, this study examines the effect of Vietnamese EZs on several 
outcomes, namely household income per capita, household living expenditure per capita, 
individual labor force participation and school attendance probability by age cohort. In 
addition, we test the pollution haven hypothesis of whether the establishment of EZs is 
associated with more health issues and loss proxied by absent days from routine work. Our 
research is motivated by several important facts and existing literature as follows. 
First, whether EZs impact household income is debatable. Papke (1994), Ham et al. 
(2011), Ali and Peerlings (2012), Busso et al. (2013), Chaurey (2017), and Zheng et al. (2017) 
reported higher incomes due to clustered firms in both developed and developing countries. 
However, Neumark and Kolko (2010) documented that the EZ program in California did not 
reduce unemployment. Meanwhile, Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) found limited evidence to 
show that the Federal Empowerment Zone program in the United States aided underprivileged 
individuals. Meanwhile, if agglomeration economies exist along with improved infrastructure 
as a result of EZs, quality of life could increase. This could lead to a higher cost of living due 
to the influx demand and labor mobility. Therefore, household income increases, and whether 
EZs improve the real net household disposable income, is not a direct result. 
Second, increased income and the rising demand for labor, if any, would complicate 
household or individual decisions regarding investment in education. Parents might invest 
more in their children’s education, either in terms of quantity or quality, due to the wealth effect 
and increased returns to education (Glewwe and Jacoby, 2004; Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999; 
Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2005). However, since parents can suddenly become full-time 
employees, there could be in increased need for intra-household work. Therefore, children may 
have to compensate (Basu and Van, 1998), as a substitution effect. This would affect children’s 
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education (Beegle et al., 2009) in terms of school absenteeism or dropping out of school 
altogether. Similarly, if job opportunities surge with the possibility of higher incomes, 
individuals may reconsider their decisions regarding years of education, especially if an 
additional year is at individual cost (and expensive). 
Third, Vietnamese EZs boomed during 2000 and 2007 as illustrated in Graph 1. Newly 
established EZs during this period are four times more compared to all previous existing EZs 
combined. The literature for environmental standards for EZs were homogenous nationwide. 
However, with the intense outbreak of EZs and to compete with other regions, local 
government possibly relaxed law enforcement and monitoring efforts to attract new firms and 
investors. For example, during the Formosa incident in Vietnam in 2016, Hoang et al., (2019) 
revealed that a single firm in the Vung Ang Economic Zone discharged toxic wastewater into 
the ocean. This resulted in an immediate loss of an estimated 42–46% of revenue suffered by 
the fishing industry in the affected area (the sector accounted for 3.8% of employment and 
7.3% of income in coastal areas).  
[Insert Graph 1 here] 
We analyzed Vietnamese households and individuals using the Household Living 
Standard Survey (2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008) and the 2007 Establishment Census (containing 
a census of EZs). We combined the two main sources through communal identity. We selected 
districts without any EZs before 2003. We used the “winner and loser” strategy similar to Vu 
and Yamada (2019), to select communes with EZs as the treatment group, and communes 
without EZs that are located in the same district, as the control group until 2008. However, 
districts containing both groups should not have any zones established prior to 2003. We 
compared households in the two groups using both differences-in-differences (DID) and a 
panel-event study approach. Our findings indicated that household income per capita were 
higher in the treatment commune associated with EZs. However, there was no wealth effect on 
school attendance probability for individuals under the age of 18 years. In the interim, we did 
not find any substitution effect. The difference between the two groups in terms of working 
probability in any age cohort was insignificant. Similarly, we found no difference in the 
frequency of illnesses, the number of times receiving inpatient or outpatient care, as well as the 
number of days absent due to illness. As over 94% of households owned houses, the increase 
in property prices and income while maintaining the same living expenditure per capita, 
implied EZs would positively impact Vietnamese households. 
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Our study contributes several important facts to the literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to test whether the presence of EZs might result in different 
health outcomes in Vietnam. Second, our analyses use direct household and individual 
outcomes and provided direct evidence of any possible impact. Third, our findings add 
additional insights to the impact of EZs on Vietnamese households and individuals during the 
5-year period. 
 The paper is organized as follows. We report on essential related literature in Section 
2. We describe the data used in Section 3, followed by our identification strategy and methods 
in Section 4. We report and discuss the findings in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes our 
research.  
2. Literature review 
The impact of place-based policies on various outcomes, either at household, individual 
or firm level in developed countries, have been examined extensively. However, conclusions 
on household and individual outcomes have not always been consistent. For example, Fishback 
(2017) summarized that during the relief spending of the New Deal during the 1930s, initiated 
by Roosevelt’s administration, at least 26 research papers presented positive impacts, 
indifferences, or even opposite conclusions. The relief spending possibly decreased property 
crime rates; however, it had limited or even a negative impact on private employment 
(Fishback, 2017). Similarly, Neumark and Kolko (2010) showed that California’s EZ program 
did not increase employment. Reynolds and Rohlin (2015) found no evidence that 
underprivileged households in the United States benefited from the Federal Empowerment 
Zone (FEZ) program. In contrast, by measuring the impact of State Enterprise Zones, FEZ, and 
Federal Enterprise Community on local employment, Ham et al. (2011) found significant 
results such as a higher employment rate, a decline in the poverty rate and a higher proportion 
of wage and salary income. Even if the place-based policy places more weight on capital than 
on employment, as per the Indiana enterprise zone (adopted in 1983 during the Regan 
administration), the zone’s impact on local employment is still significant and positive (Papke, 
1994).  
Similarly, by examining the Zones Franches Urbaines (ZFU) in France, Givord et al. 
(2013) found that the ZFU attracted more business from both new and reallocated companies, 
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and increased total employment in the area. However, the ZFU only had an impact on local 
wages in remote areas (Briant et al., 2015). On other aspects, Krupka and Noonan (2009) found 
the FEZ increased property values (through improved services and infrastructure, a decrease 
in crime, and more employment opportunities) and changes in the residential location choices.  
These varying conclusions may be the result of using different comparison groups (Vu 
and Yamada, 2019). Finding an appropriate comparison (control) group is crucial but 
challenging. The reason for this, is that the decision for selecting an area for the EZ is not 
exogenous. For example, Felix and Hines (2013) showed that American communities offer 
special treatment for firms with low revenues, that are located close to a state border, or that 
are faced with issues in terms of political cultures. In addition, political decision makers are 
likely to select the location with the highest possibility for obtaining designed policy goals. 
The timing in passing a policy could also not be exogenous. For example, states often increase 
minimum wages while the economy is healthy (Card and Krueger, 1995). Vu and Yamada 
(2019) summarized several practical measures in the literature to construct counterfactuals 
such as propensity score matching, comparison between zones with candidates in a “loser-
winner” effect, and the geographical boundary discontinuity combined with DID. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, more researchers use data from developed 
countries than from developing countries. Abeberese and Chaurey (2019) found that the New 
Industrial Policy for Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh (India) resulted in a decrease in 
informal businesses, while maintaining a high number of formal firms. Chaurey (2017) also 
established that the place-based policy increased employment, output, fixed capital, and the 
number of firms. Similarly, using night light data as the outcome and analyzing the same place-
based policy for Uttarakhand, Shenoy (2018) found the treatment region’s economic activities 
rose sharply compared to a region located on the state border. In addition, Chaurey (2017) 
indicated an increase in wage workers, but not in property rental or migration in treatment 
areas. Meanwhile, Ali and Peerlings (2012) revealed that industrial clusters promote structural 
changes: in rural Ethiopia, farm households created non-farm businesses that resulted in a 
higher household income. From the perspective of a different type of place-based policy, such 
as a poverty eradication program, Jalan and Ravallion (1998) discovered increased 
consumption. In addition, Wang (2013) illustrated that special economic zones in China 
promoted wages to increase more rapidly than living costs. Growth in local employment and 
wages, due to industrial parks, attracted housing construction and consumption in China 
(Zheng et al. 2017). 
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In Vietnam, the initial private EZ was established as early as 1991 (Vu and Yamada, 
2019). In early times, Vietnamese EZs were controlled directly by the prime minister. From 
2008 onwards, control was assigned to provincial government. Two typical policies included 
tax incentives and motivations for land rent (see Vu and Yamada, 2019 for specific policy 
descriptions). The two correspond with industrial zones (IZ, hereafter) and industrial clusters 
(IC, hereafter) 1 . Vu and Yamada (2019) found that IZs and ICs resulted in a higher 
concentration of firms with nine or more workers in the commune, since the zone was 
established. They found an incrementing number of firms and employment within the treatment 
commune. This impacted not only firms located within the zone, but also businesses located 
within the commune, but outside the zone border (Vu and Yamada, 2019). However, whether 
IZs or ICs impacted local households and individuals, remains to be investigated. For example, 
it was not clear whether the source of labor from the increment came from local households or 
internal migration. Moreover, the Formosa incident (see Hoang et al., 2019) in 2016 raised an 
interesting research question regarding the pollution haven hypothesis. Specifically, whether 
EZs create more health and environmental issues than possible income advantages. 
3. Data 
Our analysis relied on a combination of commune2 identities between two important 
sources of data. The first one refers to the 2007 Establishment Census (ES), conducted by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO). Following Vu and Yamada (2019), we extracted 
information from a census of enterprise zones from the ES. The information includes location 
(detailed at commune level), year of establishment, and type of zone. We mirrored Vu and 
Yamada’s approach (2019) precisely to classify zones into either industrial zone or industrial 
cluster. IZs were established and directly controlled by the prime minister (central 
government), while ICs were managed by the provincial government. Vu and Yamada (2019) 
 
1 In Vietnamese, IZ consists of “khu công nghiệp/nghệ” (industrial/manufacturing zone), “khu chế xuất” (export 
processing zone), “khu kinh tế” (economic zone), and “khu công nghệ cao” (high-technology zone) while IC 
includes “cụm công nghiệp” (industrial cluster), and “làng nghề” (industrial village/community). 
2 Commune is the 3rd level of the national administration division in Vietnam. There were about over 10,000 
communes. The 2nd level is district which consists of about 700 districts in total. The 1st level is province (61–63 
during 2002–2008). 
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noted that Vietnam lacked legislation to regulate IC establishment by 2008. The detailed 
distribution of the establishment and nature of zones can be found in Table 1 and Graph 1. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The second one is the Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) from 
2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. The VHLSS has been conducted by the GSO once every two 
years since 2002. Based on the renowned Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) by 
the World Bank, the VHLSSs are country specific and were sampled using a two-stage 
stratified approach. The VHLSSs between 2002 and 2008 used the same sampling units from 
the 1999 Vietnamese Population and Housing Census. We noted that the majority (97.95%, 
98.21%, and 98.57% in 2004, 2006, and 2008, respectively3) of individuals in the VHLSS had 
families registered within the commune. Therefore, households in VHLSSs most likely 
originated from and had been living in the commune for a long time. 
From each wave, we gathered several outcomes at household level for households 
residing in the selected communes (to be explained in more detail subsequently) from the main 
questionnaires: general information, education, employment (working), income, expenditure, 
health and housing 4 . Outcomes included the logarithm of household income per capita 
(!"	(%"&'()	*. &)), average household working hours (for the main occupation5) among 
members of 18+ years for 12 months prior the survey (-'./0"1	ℎ'3.4	*. 5), household living 
expenditure per capita (!"	(6070"1	)8*)"90:3.)	*. &)), and property price6 per square meter 
(!"	(ℎ'340"1	*.0&)	*.(2)). In addition, we included indicators for the frequency of illnesses 
developed (counted in last 4 week, (<.)=. 4?) and 12 months, (<.)=. 12() prior to the 
survey), inpatient (%"*5:0)":) or outpatient (A3:*5:0)":) care per capita, and the average 
number of absent days (per capita) from routine activities (BC4)":	95D4) due to the illness 
within 12 months prior to the survey. 
Also, we added important outcomes at individual level for the corresponding 
households. We used the information regarding whether an individual attends school 
 
3 VHLSS 2002 did not enquire such information. 
4 GSO used each questionnaire for country representative samples for their intended purposes. Every household 
in VHLSS was asked for several or (not compulsory) all questionnaires.  
5 VHLSS defined the main job as the job that individuals undertook for most of the working time. 
6 Land is state property in Vietnam. However, Vietnamese laws allowed the right to use land to be transferred and 
traded. We used the expected property price. In general, the price for the house included the land usage right.  
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(E&ℎ''6	5::)"95"&)) for each of the three main age cohorts (7–107, 11–14, and 15–17 years) 
corresponding to the Vietnamese school system (compulsory primary school with 5 grades, 
secondary school with 4 grades, and high school with 3 grades, respectively). In addition, we 
also use the information on working activity status to ascertain whether an individual is 
employed (-'./0"1). The 2004–2008 VHLSS enquired from respondents aged 6 and above 
(the 2002 VHLSS questioned only those aged 10 and above) whether they have ever been 
employed in work that generated income in the 12 months prior to the survey. Additionally, 
we specified the work category for members aged 18 and above (hereafter, 18+) in three cases 
across the corresponding age cohorts with salaried work (E565.0)9	?'./), self-employed 
work related to agriculture, aquaculture and forestry (E)6F − )(*6'D)9	:D*)	B), and other 
self-employed work (E)6F − )(*6'D)9	:D*)	H). Finally, we also repeatedly calculated the 
outcomes related to health similar to those at household level (<.)=. 4? , <.)=. 12( , 
%"*5:0)":, A3:*5:0)":, and BC4)":	95D4). The descriptive statistics of the outcomes are 
presented in Appendices 1–3.  
4. Methods 
4.1 Identification strategy and sample selection 
Vu and Yamada (2019) noted how an area was selected by candidates to build a zone, 
and though endogenous, no transparency was shared with citizens, especially local 
communities in Vietnam. Vu and Yamada (2019) revealed that by 2008 the prime minister of 
Vietnam was the only eligible individual to establish IZs, while the Provincial People’s 
Committee president could establish ICs. As noted in Graph 1, enterprise zones were not 
popular during the early 2000s. However, the period between 2003 and 2007 observed the 
highest growth in the number of new zones, equal to the total of all existing zones. Therefore, 
zone establishment could act as an exogenous shock to commune households and common 
citizens.  
 
7 We chose 7 instead of 6 because Vietnamese regulations on education allows all children born in the same year 
to go to school for the same grade, rather than by age. Therefore, 7 secured all children under compulsory 
education. 
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Similar to Vu and Yamada (2019), our identification strategy relies on the “winner-
loser” approach. The approach assumption is that a losing area constitutes a valid 
counterfactual for the concurrent winning area, conditional on the control of pre-existing trends 
and various fixed effects (Greenstone et al., 2010). Greenstone et al. (2010) suggested that the 
winning area should show a similar trend in most economic variables compared to the losing 
area. We also assumed that other communes in the same district (the potential losers) of the 
winner, were considered potential candidates by policy makers. The distance to harbors and 
airports were similar for the losers and the winner (Vu and Yamada, 2019).  
Therefore, we followed Vu and Yamada’s (2019) identification strategy on selecting 
communes with EZs. We elected districts that did not have any EZs from 2000–2002, but 
accommodated EZs by 2008. We inherited the data on EZs for a country representative of 
1,971 communes in 124 districts from Vu and Yamada (2019), in the same selection categories.  
However, since the VHLSSs cover more than 2,901–3,961 communes out of the total 
of approximately 10,000–11,000 communes in Vietnam, when layering the VHLSS communes 
on the commune data of Vu and Yamada (2019) for each corresponding year, we roughly 
obtained that 30% of communes (583–772 communes in 112–113 districts) matched. Then, we 
ensured that each district had at least one control and one treatment commune. The treatment 
commune refers to one in which an EZ was established by July 2007. Meanwhile, the control 
commune is within the same district as the treatment commune, but without an EZ prior to 
2007. The selection secures the validity of commune fixed effects explained in the next section. 
However, this resulted in a selection between 283–287 communes (in each wave8) in 52 
identical districts and/or 8,726 households over four respective years (see Appendix 2).  
However, we acknowledged that the commune’s decision to build a zone might be 
based on households’ existing characteristics, although this decision was more likely 
exogenous to their knowledge. For example, the objectives of policy makers could be either to 
eradicate poverty or to attract firms by targeting a higher productive local labor force (proxied 
by the average educational level of communes with a population of 18+ years). In our selection, 
policy makers could have selected the latter since the number of schooling years among 
 
8 There were 291 identical communes for the whole period 2002–2008; however, there was also attrition. In 
addition, each commune with a zone, hosted either IZs or ICs.  
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individuals of 18+ years was roughly 0.616 years more in the treatment commune in 2002, as 
observed in Appendix 1.  
Also, we acknowledged the endogenous timing for zone establishment. For example, 
Graph 1 showed the Vietnamese government seemed to establish numerous zones (as many as 
all the previous years combined) during 2003 and 2006, before gaining access to the World 
Trade Organization in 2007. However, in the interim, there was a variation in the timing within 
the short period between 2003 and 2007. Therefore, we can exploit this variation by examining 
the length of zone establishment and by using a panel-event study. 
4.2 Methods 
We applied differences-in-differences (DID) and a panel event-study to identify the effect of 
enterprise zones on household and/or individual outcomes. 
For DID, we selected only the VHLSSs for 2002 and 2008. We started with the 
following reduced form equation for each household/individual 0  for a set of s outcomes 
(A3:&'()!"#) defined in Section 3, using commune fixed effects (FE) and clustered standard 
errors at household-level: 
(1) A3:&'()!# = J$	K'") × : + J%	: + J&	&'((3") +	J'N! + O!, 
where t=1 if it was year 2008, and K'")" equal to 1 if the &'((3") accommodated the EZ by 
2008 (otherwise a value of zero was attributed). J$  acts as the DID estimator. Where N! 
appears, we used the most significant characteristics as control variables. As long as K'") is 
uncorrelated with any household/individual characteristics lying in O! , the equation (1) 
identifies the effect of the enterprise zone on household/individual outcomes. More 
specifically, at household level, we used the average schooling years (P'34)ℎ'69	)93&5:0'") 
among members aged 18+ years in our estimations where outcomes were related to income 
and school attendance. Additionally, we also used four dummies (simplified as 
QD*)	'F	*.'*).:D) for five types of properties (villas; concrete houses with; or without a 
shared kitchen, toilet and bathroom; semi-concrete houses; and temporary houses) when 
analyzing the property price. Similarly, at individual level, we used years of schooling where 
outcomes were related to the employment of members aged 18+ years. Meanwhile, we used 
P'34)ℎ'69	)93&5:0'" for outcomes of children under 18 years. We also considered gender 
differences (E)8 equals 1 if female, 0 otherwise). 
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 However, since the year of zone establishment varied per commune, we took advantage 
of this useful variation information corresponding with IZs and ICs, and modified (1) to: 
(2) A3:&'()! = R$	%S × 	K'")	)8*).0)"&) + R%%T × 	K'")	)8*).0)"&)	 + R(: +
R)&'((3")	+	R*N! + O!, 
where K'")	)8*).0)"&) = 0 if the zone had not yet been established at the time t (i.e. 2008). 
In other cases, K'")	)8*).0)"&) equals to the year interval between time t (i.e. 2008) and the 
year of establishment of the initial zone in the &'((3"). 
 Similar to z'")	)8*).0)"&) , we deployed a panel-event study by using a set of 
dummies indicating the point of the year t relative to the year of establishment of the first zone 
in the &'((3")" . The base line is the year of the original zone establishment. More 
specifically, C)F'.)* = 1 if the &'((3") was 7 years before the initial zone was established. 
Similarly, 5F:).$ = 1, …, 5F:).' = 1 when it was one to four years after the establishment of 
the zone, correspondingly. The set of dummies equal zero otherwise. 
 We shifted our analysis to a panel-event study, since we were unable to test for the DID 
important assumption on the parallel trend with only two waves of data. We added the VHLSS 
from 2004 and 2006 to the current sample for the following equation: 
(3) A3:&'()! = V$	C)F'.)+ + V%	5F:)., + V&	&'((3") +	V'N! + 
V(-C54)60")- 	× : + V)	904:.0&:	 × : + W!. 
H54)60")"- refers to four commune characteristics (k = [1, 4]) measured in 2000 including the 
distances from the commune to the nearest harbor and international airport, and two aggregated 
business indicators, namely the logarithm of total capital and sales per workers among firms 
(with more than 9 employees) located in the commune in 2000. We obtained the characteristics 
from Vu and Yamada (2019), in which business indicators originated from the Vietnam 
Enterprise Survey, 2000 (see Vu and Yamada, 2019 for the detailed description of the data and 
the four commune characteristics). V(-  captures the effect of commune endowments with 
possible nonlinear effects by the time the zone was established. Meanwhile, V). captures the 
average time trend of each district. 
Finally, we constructed two dummies similar to K'") × : in equation (1): IZ started 
and IC started. IZ refers to the approximate impact of industrial zones, while IC references 
industrial clusters. This method decomposed the average difference between the two types of 
EZs. We used the following equation for our final estimation: 
 
12 
(4) A3:&'()! = V$+	C)F'.)+ + V%,	5F:)., + V&	&'((3") +	V'N! + V(- 	C54)60")- 	×
: + V)	904:.0&:	 × : + V*	%S	4:5.:)9 + V/	%T	4:5.:)9 + W!. 
This method enabled us to test the parallel trend assumption. The test hypothesis is that all V$+ 
(m = [–7, –1]) equally.  
5. Results 
5.1 Income, working hours, living expenditure, and property price 
We found that EZs were associated with higher household income per capita. As per 
Table 2, the logarithm of household income per capita increased by 3.24 percentage points 
compared to each year since the IZ was established in the household’s commune. However, 
we noted that the baseline comparison in Appendix 1 showed a significant difference in 
household income per capita. Therefore, we employed a panel-event study to cross-check and 
confirm the robustness of the results. 
[Insert Table 2 and 3 here] 
Our corresponding analysis using the panel-event study as per Table 3, confirmed the 
validity of previous results from using the DID approach. In column (1) of Table 3, the parallel 
trend is valid as H0: all “before” equal coefficients were not rejected. Meanwhile, H0 for the 
difference between IZ and IC (IZ started = IC started = 0) was rejected. Furthermore, we noted 
that we cannot derive a conclusion from the estimation using a panel-event study where the 
parallel trend assumption is violated. 
We did not find any evidence indicating an increase in household living expenditure 
per capita (negative signs of zone coefficients appeared instead) as presented in Table 2. 
Combined with an increase in household income, our results are in line with those from Wang 
(2013) based on China. 
Additionally, the estimations in columns (7) and (8) from Table 2 showed an increase 
in property prices. More specifically, there was an increase of 8.54 percentage points per year 
in the logarithm of property price per square meter in IZ communes. We did not find the same 
increment among households in IC communes. In addition, the comparison in Appendix 1 
showed that property prices would have been equal in the baseline. Therefore, we can respond 
to DID results without referring to the panel-event study results, and conclude that the zone 
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could have induced an increase in property prices in the local commune. We noted that the 
majority (94.1%, 94.7%, 95.8%, 95.8% in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, correspondingly) of 
Vietnamese households in the VHLSS owned houses. Therefore, the increased cost of housing 
could benefit households in the treatment communes.  
We further examined the reasons for an increase in household income per capita in the 
treatment group. First, we tested whether the working probability for specific job types could 
have been adjusted at individual level. We found that individuals aged 18+ years in treatment 
communes are more likely to have salaried work, especially in IC communes as shown in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. The results suggest that local employment would have 
increased, which are consistent with and contribute to Vu and Yamada’ findings (2019). 
Meanwhile, EZs could have scaled down the participation rate in self-employed jobs for both 
type A and type B. We further divided the sample into male and female groups as per Appendix 
4, in which the results are consistent with those found in the combination. We noted there could 
have been an increment in salaried work for females in association with IZs. However, there is 
no statistically significant difference observed from the corresponding male group. The results 
agree with Vu and Yamada (2018, and 2020) in that there are more opportunities for women 
to acquire paid jobs, specifically those associated with foreign investment firms, to decrease 
the gender wage gap. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
However, we acknowledged that the results from the DID approach in Table 4 should be 
interpreted using caution. The reason being, that corresponding estimations in the panel-event 
study showed no statistically significant EZ effect on salaried work and self-employed type A.  
Second, we investigated the average working hours of households within 12 months 
prior to the survey, for the main occupation of members aged 18+ years. The results, evident 
in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2, indicated the EZ increased working hours by approximately 
42.74 hours per year, due to zone experience in the treatment group. The numbers are 51.5 and 
36 hours for IZ and ICs, respectively. Unfortunately, the VHLSS did not specify the job type 
of individuals’ main occupation. Therefore, we were unable to explore the purposes behind 
this more thoroughly. 
5.2 Health issues 
Given that households would have maximized their available HI whenever household 
members were ill, we examined the probability and consequences of illnesses, namely the 
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number of absent days (per capita within 12 months prior to the survey) from routine work. 
We acknowledged that our analysis was limited to a short period of time (<5 years) in 
experiencing an EZ. We noted that we cannot apply DID for outcomes related to the average 
number of times inpatient/outpatient care is received, the average number of times an illness 
occurs (4 weeks/12 months prior the survey), and absent days from routine work as a result. 
The reason for this being that the information was not requested in the 2002 VHLSS (the 
baseline). However, given that the zone experience time varied across communes, we can 
duplicate the estimations in equation (4) without using the 2002 wave data as per Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We did not find an increase in the risk of experiencing health issues in either 4 weeks 
or 12 months prior to the survey, in both household and individual analysis as shown in 
columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) of Table 5. Since H0: all zone coefficients = 0 was not rejected 
in all corresponding estimations, while even the coefficients related to zones attained negative 
signs. In addition, the difference in the number of times outpatient/inpatient care was received, 
was statistically insignificant. The parallel trend condition was met in all estimations. H0: No 
zone coefficients = 0 were rejected in columns (3) and (4), while none of the single zone 
coefficients were statistically significant in column (9) of Table 5.  
Further, as seen in column (5) of Table 5, when ICs were established in a commune, 
local households experienced more absent days from routine work due to illness, which could 
suggest a possibility of severe consequences in terms of health issues. However, all 
corresponding hypothesis test results (H0: All zone coefficients=0; H0: IZ started=IC 
started=0; and H0: All zone coefficients =0) in columns (5) and (10) of Table 5 supported the 
argument that there is no zone effect9 at either household or individual level. Therefore, we 
acknowledged that the interpretation for more severe consequences of health issues should be 
interpreted with caution.  
5.3 School attendance and working probability among members under 18 years 
 We did not find any statistical increase in school attendance among individuals of 
eligible age for general education. The sign for corresponding coefficients were all negative as 
 
9 We further excluded 32 households with more than 99 days absent from routine work due to illness, to eliminate 
the possibility of outliers. However, the results (available upon request) were consistent with the ones in column 
(5). 
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evident in Table 6 for the DID approach. However, while parallel trend assumptions were met, 
no H0: All zone coefficients = 0 were rejected in columns (7), (8), and (9) of Table 6. The 
evidence confirms a zero zone effect. However, we also acknowledged three elements 
pertaining to school attendance that have yet to be discussed. These include the ability of an 
average child in the household to study, their past school attendance, and the household 
decision to adjust schooling years conditional on the establishment of enterprise zones (with 
changes in employment availability and earnings). 
[Insert Table 6 and 7 here] 
 Finally, we did not find any significant zone effect on working probability for the three 
age cohorts, as observed in Table 7. Hypothesis tests (H0: All zone coefficients =0) also 
strongly support our argument, while the parallel trend assumptions were all valid.  
6. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the impact of EZs on Vietnamese household and individual 
outcomes from 2000–2007 using DID and the panel-event study approaches. We found EZs 
are associated with a higher household income per capita and property prices in the zone 
commune, but not for the household living expenditure per capita. We did not find any 
statistical significant increases or decreases in school attendance, nor in working probability 
among members aged between 7 and 17 years. Within 5 years of zone establishment, we did 
not find a difference in terms of the frequency of illness, inpatient and outpatient care, and 
number of absent days from routine work due to illness. While we did not find any evidence 
relating to significant decreases in living expenditure, school attendance, and health outcomes, 
the increases in income and property prices suggests that EZs have a positive impact on 
Vietnamese households and individuals overall. 
However, we also acknowledged several drawbacks in this study for future research 
agendas. First, households in the treatment and control groups were not homogenous in terms 
of the average household education level. Second, our analyses covered a short window of 
observation limited to 5 years, without the long-term effects of EZs. Third, we were unable to 
place more control variables at household level due to the limitation of the data. A panel data 
of the matching households is the ideal scenario replacement. Fourth, income and housing 
prices might contain measurement errors. Household respondents declared the expected market 
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price of their house or land, according to his/her best knowledge. Survey timings varied within 
a wave of VHLSS; therefore, we were unable to exclude the time trend value and fluctuation 
of the price within a year. Also, the prices did not reflect the ones recorded by real purchases 
in the market. Fifth, spillover effects could have occurred. Since the treatment and control 
communes were located in the same district within geographical proximity, individuals from 
the zone commune could have commuted to work. Therefore, the difference in household 
income per capita could be under-estimated.  
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Appendix 1 Descriptive statistics for DID approach   
 
2002 
    
2008 
    
 Control  Treated  Diff. Control  Treated  Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2)–(4) (6) (7) (8) (9) (7)–(9) 
Household level 2,114  605   3,328  959   
Household size 
 
4.1883 
 
4.3124 –0.1241 
 
3.8675 
 
4.0125 –0.1450** 
Household education  5.6803  6.1594 –0.4790*** 3,327 7.4893  7.7413 –0.2520** 
Ln (Income p.c)  8.0121  8.1211 –0.1090*** 
 
9.0196  9.1227 –0.1031*** 
Ln (Living expenditure p.c)†  7.7645  7.8396 –0.0750*** 666 8.7608 192 8.8570 –0.0962** 
Ln (housing price p.m2) 2,106 6.2055 602 6.4737 –0.2682 3,322 7.4020 956 7.7229 –0.3210*** 
Having health insurance 
 
0.3070  0.3074 –0.0004 2,482 0.1821 703 0.1693 0.0128 
Among 18+ working member           
   Average working hour for 12 months‡ 2,026 1598.658 577 1767.916 –169.258*** 3,151 1506.925 904 1714.777 –207.852*** 
           
Individual level           
Aged 7-10§ 805  240   786  233   
  Sex   0.4571  0.5458 –0.0887**  0.4898  0.4893 0.0005 
  Working 205 0.0243 65 0.0461 –0.0218  0.0115  0.0086 0.0029 
  School attendance  0.9734  0.9917 –0.0153  0.9637  0.9516 0.0121 
Aged 11-14  936  292   1,140  329   
  Sex  0.4850  0.4383 0.0467  0.5017  0.4802 0.0215 
  Working  0.1579  0.1027 0.0522**  0.0851  0.0365 0.0486*** 
  School attendance  0.9081  0.9418 –0.0337*  0.9456  0.9422 0.0034 
Aged 15-17 657  198   1,044  282   
  Sex  0.4734  0.4545 0.0188  0.4962  0.4220 0.0742** 
  Working  0.4551  0.3687 0.0864**  0.3362  0.2837 0.0525* 
  School attendance  0.6149  0.6869 –0.0720*  0.6906  0.7553 –0.0647** 
Aged 18+  5,570  1,635   10,154  3,033   
   Sex  0.5223  0.5309 –0.0086  0.5379  0.5282 0.0097 
   Years of schooling  6.9957  7.612 –0.6165***  7.5578  7.8432 –0.2854*** 
   Salaried work  0.3199  0.2911 0.0288**  0.3247  0.3343 –0.0096 
   Self-employed (related to agriculture, 
   aquaculture, and forestry) type A 
 0.6714  0.5608 0.1106***  0.5805  0.4405 0.1400*** 
   Self-employed (others) type B  0.2068  0.3248 –0.1180***  0.1805  0.2239 –0.0434*** 
Notes: (†) In the original 2008 VHLSS, only 9,189 out of 45,945 households were questioned about information on household expenditure. (‡) We omitted 422 households 
(1% of upper bound of its distribution) with the average working hours in 12 months prior to the survey for the main occupation > 3,624 hours (over 9.928 hours per day for 
each day of the year). (§) The 2002 VHLSS requested information on the working status of those aged 10 years and above.
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Appendix 2 Descriptive statistics for panel-event study approach at household level 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household level 8,726     
Household size 
 
4.0333 1.6203 1 13 
Residing in a zone commune 
 
0.2226 0.4160 0 1 
Year 2002 
 
0.3116 0.4632 0 1 
Year 2004 
 
0.0986 0.2981 0 1 
Year 2006 
 
0.0986 0.2981 0 1 
Year 2008 
 
0.4913 0.5000 0 1 
IZ started 
 
0.0456 0.2087 0 1 
IC started 
 
0.0925 0.2897 0 1 
Ln (Income p.c) 
 
8.6325 0.7692 4.9416 12.0717 
Ln (Living expenditure p.c) † 5,297 8.0841 0.6148 6.4345 10.3498 
Ln (Housing price p. m2) 8,702 7.0042 1.0594 –0.5108 10.7609 
Among 18+ working member 8,304     
  Working hour p.a‡  1576.097 678.911 0 3,624 
Average per household member * 6,007     
   Illness - Freq. 4w 
 
0.4242 0.6522 0 2 
   Illness - Freq. 12m 
 
0.5288 0.5401 0 2 
   Absent days due to illness 
 
6.6385 17.1453 0 365 
Inpatient (times) 3,803 0.1428 0.3954 0 8 
Outpatient (times) 3,803 1.9424 3.0238 0 42 
Number of identical districts 52     
Number of identical communes 291     
Number of IZ by 2008 21     
Number of IC by 2008 43     
Notes:  
(†) and (‡) are the same as in Appendix 1. 
*** The 2002 VHLSS did not contain information on health at individual level as well as these categories.
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Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics for panel-event study approach at individual level 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All 37,656     
Sex 
 
0.5148 0.4998 0 1 
Year 2002  0.3044 0.4602 0 1 
Year 2004  0.1024 0.3032 0 1 
Year 2006  0.0999 0.2999 0 1 
Year 2008  0.4933 0.5000 0 1 
Frequency of illness      
   Freq. 4w 26,193 0.4386 0.7066 0 2 
   Freq. 12m 21,331 0.6525 0.6542 0 2 
Absent days due to illness 14,484 12.3732 30.3799 0 365 
Times in 12 months prior the survey      
   Outpatient 11,146 2.6036 3.6994 0 70 
   Inpatient 11,146 0.1936 0.5668 0 12 
Household having health insurance 28,744 0.2374 0.4255 0 1 
      
Aged 7-10 2,613     
Sex  0.4768 0.4996 0 1 
Working  1,838 0.0163 0.1267 0 1 
School attendance  0.9782 0.1461 0 1 
      
Aged 11-14 3,414     
Sex  0.4918 0.5000 0 1 
Working   0.1163 0.3206 0 1 
School attendance  0.9335 0.2492 0 1 
      
Aged 15-17 2,783     
Sex  0.4650 0.4989 0 1 
Working   0.3705 0.4830 0 1 
School attendance  0.6813 0.4661 0 1 
      
Aged 18+ 25,521 
    
Sex  0.5318 0.4990 0 1 
Years of schooling  7.4367 3.8733 0 21 
Working   0.8107 0.3918 0 1 
   Salaried work  0.3213 0.4670 0 1 
   Self-employed (related to agriculture, 
   aquaculture, and forestry) type A 
 0.2102 0.4074 0 1 
   Self-employed (others) type B  0.5914 0.4916 0 1 
      
Note:  
The 2002 VHLSS did not contain information on health at individual level. 
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Appendix 4 Labor force participation among individuals aged 18+ years by gender using DID 
approach 
VARIABLES Salaried 
work 
Salaried 
work 
Self-
employed 
Type A 
Self-
employed 
Type A 
Self-
employed 
Type B 
Self-
employed 
Type B 
Female (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Zone experience 0.0129**   –0.0210***   –0.0156**  
 (0.0062)   (0.0069)   (0.0068)  
IZ experience   0.0163*   –0.0461***  0.0075 
   (0.0089)   (0.0097)  (0.0093) 
IC experience   0.0101   –0.0009  –0.0340*** 
   (0.0079)   (0.0086)  (0.0088) 
N (households) 10,841 10,841 10,841 10,841 10,841 10,841 
R-squared 0.123 0.123 0.244 0.245 0.147 0.148 
       
Male (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Zone experience 0.0038   –0.0104   –0.0235***  
 (0.0079)   (0.0074)   (0.0072)  
IZ experience   –0.0172   –0.0381***  –0.0052 
   (0.0110)   (0.0104)  (0.0102) 
IC experience   0.0198**   0.0106  –0.0375*** 
   (0.0100)   (0.0094)  (0.0093) 
N (households) 9,551 9,551 9,551 9,551 9,551 9,551 
R-squared 0.078 0.079 0.229 0.231 0.104 0.105 
Note: 
Sex, years of schooling, year 2008 dummy and commune FE were included in all estimations.
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Graph 1 Development of enterprise zones during 1990–2007 
 
Notes:  
Accumulated number of zones compared to that of 2007 in percentage. New IZ = number of newly established 
industrial zone. New IC = number of newly established industrial cluster. 
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Table 1 Enterprise zones as of July 2007 
 IZ    IC    
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Year of establishment 2001.40 1991 2007 2003.69 1996 2007 
Year started/expected in operation 2002.68 1992 2013 2005.56 1997 2012 
Area in the masterplan (ha) 336.29 3.82 10,000 69.43 1.1 2,111.29 
Area for lease (ha) 194.34 0 2,816.26 33.40 0 2,111.29 
 IZ    IC   
Status       
    In operation 144   189   
    Under construction 35   76   
Classification       
    Industrial (manufacturing) zone 173   17   
    Export processing zone 4   2   
    High-technology zone 0   1   
    Economic zone 2   3   
    Industrial cluster/industrial village  0   242   
Total 179   265   
Note: The table is from Vu and Yamada (2019). IZ = industrial zone; IC = industrial cluster.  
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Table 2 Effects of zones on household outcomes using DID approach 
VARIABLES Ln (Income p. c) Working hours p.a Ln (Living  
expenditure p.c) 
Ln (housing price p. m2)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Zone experience 0.0080   42.7497***  –0.0073   0.0324**   
 (0.0095)   (11.6462)  (0.0132)   (0.0132)   
IZ experience   0.0324**  51.5071***   –0.0047   0.0854*** 
   (0.0129)  (18.0739)   (0.0226)   (0.0199) 
IC experience   –0.0112  36.0414***   –0.0091   –0.0085 
   (0.0124)  (13.9740)   (0.0146)   (0.0161) 
Types of properties       Yes Yes 
N (households) 7,005 7,005 6,658 6,658 3,577 3,577 6,986 6,986 
R-squared 0.580 0.581 0.246 0.246 0.617 0.617 0.618 0.619 
Notes: 
In (1)–(6), household education was included while year 2008 dummy and commune FE were included in all estimations. 
Working hours p.a. is the average household working hours for the main occupation in 12 months prior to the survey among members aged 18+ years.  
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Table 3 Effects of zones on household outcomes using panel-event study approach 
VARIABLES Ln (income p. c) Working hours p. a  Ln (living  
expenditure p.c) 
Ln (housing price 
p. m2) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Before (–7) 0.3063 –685.9603** 0.5557** 0.1591 
 
(0.2502) (304.7126) (0.2222) (0.2595) 
Before (–6) 0.1896** –323.1814*** –0.0018 –0.3632*** 
 
(0.0962) (121.3817) (0.0974) (0.1383) 
Before (–5) 0.3633** –201.7042 0.2854* –0.2000 
 
(0.1648) (217.8439) (0.1716) (0.2137) 
Before (–4) 0.2982*** –56.9145 0.1535** 0.1389 
 
(0.0744) (101.7294) (0.0681) (0.1158) 
Before (–3) 0.3782** –447.4872** 0.2327 –0.2092 
 
(0.1502) (207.8200) (0.1599) (0.1997) 
Before (–2) 0.2033*** –46.1908 0.0648 –0.1346 
 
(0.0660) (79.0569) (0.0690) (0.0984) 
Before (–1) 0.2486* –168.7361 0.2614* –0.1463 
 
(0.1277) (179.7468) (0.1395) (0.1699) 
After (1) 0.3156*** –149.6944 0.2722* 0.0770 
 
(0.1206) (171.7450) (0.1408) (0.1604) 
After (2) –0.0091 4.3398 –0.0768 –0.1178 
 
(0.0680) (84.3380) (0.0795) (0.0978) 
After (3) 0.2419* –238.2500 0.1767 0.3037* 
 
(0.1268) (177.2051) (0.1418) (0.1710) 
After (4) 0.0169 67.3241 0.0849 0.2311* 
 
(0.0946) (114.0157) (0.1370) (0.1317) 
IZ started 0.2155*** –106.2521 0.0758 –0.1259 
 
(0.0739) (92.9460) (0.0717) (0.1050) 
IC started 0.0900 –93.9193 –0.0024 –0.1489 
 
(0.0691) (89.7368) (0.0627) (0.0992) 
Household education Yes Yes    
Types of properties     Yes 
Prob>F     
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.4135 0.0129 0.0637 0.0009 
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.1309 0.6511 0.2194 0.0076 
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.0131 0.8889 0.5008 0.2921 
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.0018 0.0962 0.0437 0.0000 
N (households) 8,725 8,304 5,297 8,702 
R-squared 0.569 0.270 0.583 0.629 
Notes: 
Commune FE, baseline-year FE, and district-year FE were included in all estimations. 
Working hours p.a. refer to the household average among members aged 18+ years for the main occupation in 12 
months prior to the survey.
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Table 4 Labor force participation among members aged 18+ years 
VARIABLES Salaried work  Self-employed 
Type A 
 Self-employed 
Type B 
 
DID (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Zone experience 0.0095*   –0.0162***   –0.0195***  
 (0.0055)   (0.0057)   (0.0058)  
IZ experience   0.0011   –0.0429***  0.0012 
   (0.0076)   (0.0080)  (0.0079) 
IC experience   0.0161**   0.0045  –0.0356*** 
   (0.0071)   (0.0071)  (0.0078) 
N (Individuals) 20,392 20,392 20,392 20,392 20,392 20,392 
R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.216 0.217 0.113 0.114 
       
Panel-event study (7)  (8)  (9)  
Prob>F       
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.5414  0.8944  0.0005  
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.6213  0.4053  0.0651  
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.4152  0.2299  0.1812  
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.2542  0.4731  0.0002  
N (Individuals) 25,521  25,521  25,521  
R-squared 0.123  0.222  0.125  
Notes:  
In (1)–(6), sex, years of schooling, year 2008 dummy and commune FE were included. 
In (7)–(9), IZ/IC started, “Before”/ “After”, years of schooling, commune FE, baseline-year FE, and district-year FE were included. 
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Table 5 Frequency of illness and its severe consequences using panel-event study 
VARIABLES Freq. 4w  Freq. 12m Inpatient Outpatient Absent days 
Household level (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IZ started –0.1153 –0.0058 0.0245 0.1548 –3.5959 
 
(0.1342) (0.1513) (0.0822) (0.7273) (5.0291) 
IC started –0.0298 –0.0270 0.0244 0.8412 7.0271*  
(0.1220) (0.1207) (0.0730) (1.0328) (4.2120) 
Prob>F      
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.5375 0.4939 0.5096 0.3695 0.5741 
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.6004 0.7260 0.9728 0.3823 0.4329 
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.6912 0.9749 0.9292 0.7131 0.1144 
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.9039 0.8234 0.8848 0.2642 0.4311 
N (Households) 3,803 3,803 3,803 3,803 3,803 
R-squared 0.223 0.255 0.276 0.309 0.139 
      
Individual level (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Prob>F      
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.1566 0.0193 0.2863 0.5692 0.4690 
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.2354 0.0589 0.5005 0.0412 0.5798 
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.5607 0.6607 0.1667 0.5568 0.1908 
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.5309 0.1444 0.0869 0.0990 0.3966 
N (Individuals) 17,281 13,224 9,589 9,589 11,440 
R-squared 0.116 0.230 0.186 0.151 0.103 
Notes: 
All outcomes were not requested in the 2002 VHLSS at individual level.  
“Before”/ “After,” HI, commune FE, commune-endowment-characteristic-year FE, district-year FE were 
included in all estimations. In (6)–(10), gender dummy was included.  
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Table 6 School attendance among individuals from 7–17 years of age 
 
Aged 7-10 
 
Aged 11-14 
 
Aged 15-17 
 
DID (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Zone experience –0.0009 
 
–0.0101 
 
–0.0053 
 
 
(0.0039) 
 
(0.0070) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
IZ experience 
 
0.0012 
 
–0.0083 
 
–0.0001   
(0.0024) 
 
(0.0099) 
 
(0.0176) 
IC experience 
 
–0.0025 
 
–0.0115 
 
–0.0095   
(0.0060) 
 
(0.0086) 
 
(0.0212) 
N (Individuals) 2,064 2,064 2,696 2,696 2,179 2,179 
R-squared 0.245 0.245 0.190 0.190 0.305 0.305 
       
Panel-event study (7)  (8)  (9)  
Prob>F       
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.3705  0.1858  0.7949  
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.6120  0.9460  0.5254  
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.9677  0.5134  0.5264  
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.4102  0.5411  0.5789  
N (Individuals) 2,613  3,413  2,781  
R-squared 0.275  0.246  0.342  
Notes:  
In (1)–(6), sex, household education, year 2008 dummy and commune FE were included. 
In (7)–(9), sex, IZ/IC started, “Before”/ “After”, household education, commune FE, commune-endowment-characteristic-year FE, district-year FE were included.
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Table 7 Labor force participation among household members from 7–17 years of age  
 Aged 7-10  Aged 11-14  Aged 15-17  
VARIABLES Working Working Working Working  Working Working  
DID (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Zone experience –0.0076   –0.0034   0.0013  
 (0.0089)   (0.0077)   (0.0148)  
IZ experience   –0.0171   –0.0091  –0.0143 
   (0.0128)   (0.0103)  (0.0173) 
IC experience   0.0001   0.0008  0.0138 
   (0.0115)   (0.0096)  (0.0211) 
N (Individuals) 1,289 1,289 2,696 2,696 2,179 2,179 
R-squared 0.2221 0.2238 0.247 0.247 0.3314 0.3318 
       
Panel-event study (7)  (8)  (9)  
Prob>F       
 H0: All “Before” are equal 0.1727  0.2794  0.3136  
 H0: All “After” = 0 0.3964  0.3350  0.2010  
 H0: IZ started=IC started=0 0.1167  0.8498  0.1502  
 H0: All zone coefficients=0 0.5121  0.6087  0.4326  
N (Individuals) 1,838  3,413  2,781  
R-squared 0.325  0.330  0.375  
Notes: 
In (1)–(6), sex, household education, year 2008 dummy and commune FE were included. 
In (7) and (9), IZ/IC started, “Before”/ “After”, household education, commune FE, baseline-year FE, and district-year FE were included. 
 
 
